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Abstract. In this paper we extend the logic of violation proposed by [14] with
time, more precisely, we temporalise that logic. The resulting system allows us to
capture many subtleties of the concept of legal compliance. In particular, the for-
mal characterisation of compliance can handle different types of legal obligation
and different temporal constraints over them. The logic is also able to represent,
and reason about, chains of reparative obligations, since in many cases the fulﬁll-
ment of these types of obligation still amount to legally acceptable situations.
1 Introduction
Developments in open MAS have pointed out that normative concepts can play a crucial
roleinmodelingagents’interaction[24,8].Likeinhumansocieties,desirableproperties
of MASs can be ensured if the interaction of artiﬁcial agents adopts institutional models
whose goal is to regiment agents’ behaviour through normative systems in supporting
coordination, cooperation and decision-making. However, to keep agents autonomous
it is often suggested that norms should not simply work as hard constraints, but rather as
soft constraints [4]. In this sense, norms should not limit in advance agents’ behaviour,
but would instead provide standards which can be violated, even though any violations
should result in sanctions or other normative effects applying to non-compliant agents.
The detection of violations and the design of agents’ compliance can amount to a rel-
atively affordable operation when we have to check whether agents are compliant with
respect to simple normative systems. But things are tremendously harder when we deal
with realistic, large and articulated systems of norms such as the law. To the best of our
knowledge, no systematic investigation has been so far proposed in this regard in the
MAS ﬁeld.
Among other things, the complexities behind the concept of legal compliance are
due to the following reasons:
ReparativeObligations Legalnormsoftenspecifyobligatoryactionstobetakenincase
of their violation. Obligations in force after some other obligations have been violated
correspond in general to contrary-to-duty obligations (CTDs) (see [7] for an overview).
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The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com.A peculiar subclass of CTDs is particularly relevant for the law: the so-called reparative
obligations. For instance, in contract and in tort law reparative obligations protect indi-
vidual legitimate interests by imposing actions that compensate any damages following
from non-compliance [12]. These constructions affect the formal characterisation of
legal compliance since they identify situations that are not ideal, but still legally ac-
ceptable. Consider the following example (where norms have as usual a conditional
structure: if the antecedents are jointly the case, then the consequent is obligatory):
Invoice ) OBLPayBy7days
OBLPayBy7days;:PayBy7days ) OBLPay5%Interest
OBLPay5%Interest;:Pay5%Interest ) OBLPay10%Interest
What about if a customer violates both the obligation to pay by 7 days after having
received the invoice for her purchase, and the obligation to pay the 5% of interest of the
due amount, but she pays the total amount plus the 10% of interest? In the legal per-
spective (which aims at protecting the rights of the vendor), the customer is compliant.
If so, these constructions can give rise to very complex rule dependencies, because
we can have that the violation of a single rule can activate other (reparative) rules,
which, in case of their violation, refer to other rules, and so forth [15]. Clearly, if we
take the above legal norms in isolation, the depicted situation is non-compliant, since
two applicable legal norms are violated. However, if we compensate the violations, then
we are still in a “legal” situation.
Obligation and Time The law makes use of different types of obligations (see Section
2) also depending on how legal effects are temporally qualiﬁed. A ﬁrst basic distinc-
tion is between those legal obligations which persist over time unless some other and
subsequent events terminate them (e.g., “If one causes damage, one has to provide com-
pensation”), and those that hold at a speciﬁc time on the condition that the norm pre-
conditions hold and with a speciﬁc temporal relationship between such preconditions
and the obligation (e.g., “If one is in a public building, one is forbidden to smoke”).
In regard to the concept of compliance, it is worth noting that we may have obliga-
tions requiring (1) to be always fulﬁlled during a certain time interval, (2) that a certain
condition must occur at least once before a certain deadline and such that the obliga-
tions may, or may not, persist after this deadline if they are not complied with, (3) that
something is done immediately [13].
Thingsaredeﬁnitelyharderwhenthesetypesofobligationsoccurinchainsofrepar-
ative obligations. For example, if the primary obligation is persistent and states to pay
before tomorrow, and the secondary (reparative) obligation is to pay a ﬁne in three days
after the violation of the primary obligation, we are compliant not only when we pay
by tomorrow, but also when we do not meet this deadline and pay both the due amount
and the ﬁne on the day after tomorrow.
Formal Requirements for Legal Compliance From a logical point of view, a formal
characterisation of the concept of legal compliance requires to address the following
related research tasks: (a) We need a logic able to handle different types of legal obli-
gation and different temporal constraints over them; (b) This logic should be able torepresent, and reason about, chains of reparative obligations. In particular, we need a
procedure for making hidden conditions and reparative chains explicit; without this, we
do not know whether a certain situation is legally acceptable; (c) We have to embed into
the logic aspects of time, such as persistence and deadlines.
Inthefollowingsectionweinformallydiscussthetypesofobligationwewillhandle
in the proposed framework.
2 The Many Faces of Obligations
We can distinguish achievement from maintenance obligations [13]. For an achieve-
ment obligation, a certain condition must occur at least once before a deadline:
Example 1. Customers must pay within 7 days, after receiving the invoice.
The deadline refers to an obligation triggered by receipt of the invoice. After that the
customer is obliged to pay. The fulﬁlment of the obligation by its deadline terminates
the persistence of the obligation.
For maintenance obligations, a certain condition must obtain during all instants
before the deadline:
Example 2. After opening a bank account, customers must keep a positive balance for
30 days.
In Example 2 the deadline only signals that the obligation is terminated: a violation
occurs when the obliged state does not obtain at some time before the deadline.
Finally, punctual obligations only apply to single instants:
Example 3. When banks proceed with any wire transfer, they must transmit a message,
via SWIFT, to the receiving bank requesting that the payment is made according to the
instructions given.
Punctual obligations apply to single instants; they can be thought as maintenance obli-
gations in force in time intervals where the endpoints are equal. Typically punctual
obligations must occur at the same time of their triggering conditions.
Norms can be associated with an explicit sanction. For example,
Example 4. Customers must pay within 7 days, after receiving the invoice. Otherwise,
10% of interest must be paid within 10 days.
Example 5. After opening a bank account, customers must keep a positive balance for
30 days. Otherwise, their account must be immediately blocked.
A sanction is often implemented through a separate obligation, which is triggered
by a detected violation. Thus, different types of obligations can be combined in chains
of reparative obligations: in Example 4, the violation of the primary achievement obli-
gation is supposed to be repaired by another achievement obligation; in Example 5, the
violation of a primary maintenance obligation is compensated by a punctual obligation.We introduced in [15,14] the non-boolean connective 
: a formula like a
b means
that a is obligatory, but if the obligation a is not fulﬁlled, then the obligation b is ac-
tivated and becomes in force until it is satisﬁed or violated. However, the violation
condition of an obligation varies depending on the types of obligations used. In the re-
mainder, we will extend the approach of [15,14] by adding temporal qualiﬁcations to
cover these cases.
3 Temporalised Violation Logic
To start with, we consider a logic whose language is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 (Language). Let T = (t1;t2;:::) be a discrete linear order of instants of
time, Atm = fa;b;:::g be a set of atomic propositions, and O be a deontic operator.
– A literal is either an atomic proposition or the negation of an atomic proposition,
that is: Lit = Atm[f:l : l 2 Atmg.
– If l 2 Lit and t 2 T , then lt is a temporal literal; > and ? are temporal literals.
TLit denotes the set of temporal literals.
– If lt is a temporal literal, then Olt and :Olt are deontic literals. The set of deontic
literals is denoted by DLit.
– If ata and btb are temporal literals, t 2 T , and ta  t, then ata 
x
t btb (for x 2
fp;m;ag) is an 
-chain.
– If a is an 
-chain, ata is a temporal literal and t 2 T , then a 
x
t ata (for x 2
fp;m;ag) is an 
-chain.
– Let a be either a temporal literal, or an 
-chain,t 2T , then ?, a
? and a
t ?
are deontic expressions. Nothing else is a deontic expression. The set of deontic
expressions is denoted by DExp.
Let us explain the intuitive meaning of the various elements of the language. The mean-
ing of a temporal literal at is that proposition a holds at time t. The deontic literal Oat
means that we have the obligation that a holds at time t. The meaning of > and ? is
that > is a proposition that is always complied with (or in other terms it is impossible
to violate) and ?, on the other hand, is a proposition that is always violated (or it is im-
possible to comply with). According to the intended meaning it is useless in the present
context to temporalise them. 
 is a binary operator to express complex normative po-
sitions. More speciﬁcally, the meaning of a deontic expression like a 
x
ta ata 

y
t0
a btb is
that the violation of a triggers a normative position whose content is btb. What counts
as a violation of ata depends on the parameter x, encoding the type of obligation whose
content is a, and the two temporal parameters ta and t0
a. The nature of the normative
position whose content is btb depends on 
y. The type of obligation whose content is
ata is determined by x. If x = p, then we have a punctual obligation (in this case we
require that ta =t0
a) and this means that to comply with this prescription have must hold
at time ta. If x = a, then we have an achievement obligation; in this case a is obligatory
from ta to t0
a, and the obligation is fulﬁlled if a holds for at least one instant of time
in the interval [ta;t0
a]. Finally, if x = m, similarly to the previous case, a is obligatory
in the interval [ta;t0
a], but in this case, to comply with the prescription, a must hold for
all the instants in the interval. As we have said, the 
 operator introduces normativepositions in response to a violation of the formula on the left of the operator, thus this
is a contrary-to-duty operator. An important application of contrary-to-duties is that a
contrary-to-duty can be used to encode a sanction or compensation or reparation for
a violation. The focus of this paper is mostly on this type of contrary-to-duties. What
about DExp? The meaning of a DExp, in particular of ? at the end of them, is that we
have reached a situation that cannot be compensated for, This means that the penulti-
mate element of a deontic expression identiﬁes the ‘last chance’ to be compliant. After
that the deontic expression results in a situation that cannot be complied with anymore.
Deﬁnition 2 (Rules/norms3). A rule r : G ,! a is an expression where r is a unique
rule label, G  TLit[DLit, ,!2 f)x;;g, a 2 DExp. If ,! is )x, the rule is a defea-
sible rule; If ,! is ;, the rule is a defeater. For defeasible rules x 2 fa;m;pg, and: If
x = a the rule is an achievement rule; If x = m the rule is a maintenance rule; If x = p
the rule is a punctual rule. For defeaters a 2 TLit.
A rule is a relationships between a set of premises and a conclusion, thus we use several
types of rules to describe different types of relationships. We use the distinction of the
types of the rules (defeasible and defeater) for the strength of the relationship between
the premises and the conclusion. The superscript x indicates the mode of a rule. The
mode of a rule tells us what kind of conclusion we can obtain from the rule. In the
context the mode identiﬁes the type of obligation we can derive. The idea is that from a
rule of mode a, an achievement rule, we derive an achievement obligation.
A defeasible rule is a rule where when the body holds then typically the conclu-
sion holds too unless there are other rules/norms overriding it. For example, when you
receive an invoice, you have the obligation to pay for it:
r1 : invoicet )a payt (1)
The meaning of the above rule is that if you received an invoice at time t, then you have
the obligation to pay for it, starting from time t.4
Defeaters are the weakest rules. They cannot be used to derive obligations, but they
can be used to prevent the derivation of an obligation. Hence, they can be used to de-
scribe exceptions to obligations, and in this perspective they can be used to terminate
existing obligations. For this reason, the arrow ; is not labeled by either a, m, nor p.
Continuing the previous example, paying for the invoice terminates the obligation to
pay for it:
r2 : paidt ; payt (2)
Rule r2 says that if you pay at time t then, from time t on, there is no longer the obliga-
tion to pay. Notice that the defeater does not introduce the prohibition to pay again.
Deﬁnition 3 (Defeasible Theory). A Defeasible Theory is a structure (F;R;), where
F, the set of facts, is a set of temporal literals; R is a set of rules; and , the superiority
relation, is a binary relation over R.
3 In the reminder, we will interchangeably use both the terms ‘norm’ and ‘rule’, but we will
prefer ‘norm’ whenever the usage of the term ‘rule’ may be confused with ‘inference rule’.
4 We assume the usual inter-deﬁnability between obligations and prohibition, thus O:  F, and
F:  O.A theory corresponds to a normative system, i.e., a set of norms, where every norm
is modelled by rules. The superiority relation is used for conﬂicting rules, i.e., rules
whose conclusions are complementary literals, in case both rules ﬁre. Notice that we
do not impose any restriction on the superiority relation, which is a binary relation that
just determines the relative strength of two rules. For example, if we consider the two
rules in (1) and (2), given an invoice, and that the invoice has been paid the two rules
alone cannot allow us to conclude anything due to the sceptical nature of Defeasible
Logic. But if we further establish that r2 r1, then the second rule prevails, and we will
conclude that we are permitted not to pay.
Deﬁnition 4. Given an 
-chain a, the length of a is the number of elements in it.
Given an 
-chain a 
x
t btb, the index of btb is n iff the length of a 
x
t btb is n. We also
say that b appears at index n in a 
x
t btb.
Deﬁnition 5 (Notation). Given a rule r : G ,! a, we use A(r) = G to indicate the
antecedent or body of the rule, andC(r) = a for the consequent or conclusion or head
of r. Given a set or rules R: R) is the set of defeasible rules in R; R; is the set of
defeaters in R; Ra is the set of achievement rules in R; Rm is the set of maintenance
rules in R; Rp is the set of punctual rules in R; R[at] is the set of rules whose head
contains at. R[at;k] is the set of rules where at is at index k in the head of the rules.
To simplify and uniform the notation we can combine the above notations, and we use
subscripts and superscripts before the indication relative of the head. Thus, for example,
R;[p10] is the set of defeaters whose head is the temporal literal p10, and the rule
r : a
t1
1 :::;atn
n )p a10
m
10b20
is in Rm
)[b20], as well as in Rp[a10] and R)[b20;2].
Finally, notice that we will sometimes abuse the notation and omit (a) the timestamp
tl in the temporal literal ltl whenever it is irrelevant to refer to it in the speciﬁc context,
(b) the mode x in the rule arrow )x when x can be instantiated with any of a, m or p,
(c) x and y in 
x
y when x and y can be instantiated, respectively, with any of a;m;p and
with any time instants.
Properties of the 
 operator When we have a deontic expression a = a1

an we
do not have information about the type of obligation for the ﬁrst element. This infor-
mation is provided when we use the expression in a rule. In this section we are going to
investigate properties of 
, in particular when two (sub-)sequences of deontic expres-
sion are equivalent and thus we can replace them preserving the meaning of the whole
expression (or rule). To simplify the notation, we introduce the following conventions.
Deﬁnition 6. Let r : G )x a be a rule, then xa is an 
-sequence. The empty se-
quence is an 
-sequence. If a 
x
ta ata 

y
t0
a b 
z
tb g is an 
-sequence, where a;b;g are

-sequences, then xata 

y
t0
a b is an 
-sequence.
Given a rule r : G ,!x a 

y
t b, a can be the empty 
-sequence, and if so, then the
rule reduces to r :G )y b.From now on, we will refer to 
-sequences simply as sequences and we will provide
properties for sequences to be used in rules.
The ﬁrst property we want to list is the commutativity of the 
 operator.
a 
x
t (b 

y
t0 g)  (a 
x
t b)

y
t0 g (3)
We extend the language with > and ?. Given their meaning, those two propositions can
be deﬁned in terms of the following sequence and equivalence5
pa0

p
0 :a0  > ?  :>: (4)
The two new propositions are useful to deﬁne reduction rules for deontic expressions.
Let us start with equivalences for >.
>
a  >: (5)
This equivalence says that a violation of > can be compensated by a; however, > is
a proposition that cannot be violated. Thus, the whole expression cannot be violated.
What about when > appears as the last element of 
?
a 
>  >: (6)
The meaning of a 
> is that > is the compensation of a, thus the violation of a is
sanctioned by >. This means that the violation of a is always compensated for, thus
we have a norm whose violation does not result in any effective sanction, thus violating
a does not produce any effect. Hence, we have two possibilities: to reject (6) if we
are interested to keep trace of violations, or to accept it if we want to investigate the
effects of violations. In this paper we take the ﬁrst option and we reject the equivalence
of a 
> and >. Notice that reducing a 
> to a would change the meaning, since
this would mean that the violation of a cannot be repaired. To see this we move to the
properties involving ?.
pata 
x
ta ?  ata (7)
The above equivalence speciﬁes that if ? is the compensation of a punctual obligation
a at time t, then there is no compensation, since the compensation cannot be complied
with. The effect of the rules is that we can eliminate ? from the deontic expression
and we maintain the same meaning. Notice, however, that the same is not true for other
types of obligations. For example, for x2fa;mg, we cannot eliminate ? from rules like
G )x at 
m
t0 ?
since the resulting expression would be G )x at and we would miss the information
about the deadline to comply with a. Nevertheless, the following equivalence states that
? can be safely eliminated if it is not the last element of a deontic expression, or when
it is the ‘compensation’ of a maintenance obligation without deadline.
a 
x
ta ?

y
t b  a 

y
ta b mata 
?  mata (8)
5 In case one wants the temporalised version, >t  pat 

p
t :at, and ?t  :>t.To complete the description for the properties for ?, we need to specify when we can
generate a new rule introducing ? from two other rules.
G )x a 

y
ta at 
ta ? D ,! :at0

t00 ?
G;D )x a 

y
ta at 
t0 1?
t <t0 and y 2 fa;mg (9)
The meaning of the above inference rule is that if we have a norm determining the
termination of an obligation, then we can encode the obligation, the time when the
obligation comes to force and the time when the norm terminates its normative effect.
The idea behind a norm like at )x bt0
is the obligation b enters into force from time t0.
Here weassume theintuition developed in[16] that a‘new’ rule takesprecedence overa
conclusion obtained in the past and carrying over to the current moment by persistence.
Thus if we have a rule ctc ) :bt00
with t00 > t0 the rule for :ct00
effectively terminates
the force of the obligation b. Consider the following instance of the rule
r1 : a5 )m b10
15? c12 )a :b12
20?
a5;c12 )m b10
11?
In this case r1 puts the obligation of b in force in the interval from 10 to 15, and r2
enforces :b from 12 to 20, thus when both conditions to apply, the effective time when
the obligation of b is in force is from 10 to 11 (after that the obligation :b enters into
force).
The 
 operator, introduced in [14], is a substructural operator corresponding to the
comma on the right hand side of a sequent in sequent system. In a classical sequent
system both the left hand side and right hand side of a sequent are set of formulas, thus
theorderoftheformulasdoesnotmatter,andpropertieslikecontractionandduplication
hold. In [14] we established the equivalence between a
a
b 
a
g and a
a
b 

g. This states that if a literal occurs multiple times, we can remove all but the ﬁrst
occurrence. We turn our attention to study conditions under which we have contraction
for the various (combination of) 
 operators we have.
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x
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p
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y
t0 g p at 
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p
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x
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a
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Table 2. Reductions to >
Tables 1 and 2 give the conditions to remove duplicates of the same atom. Consider
for example, the instance pa10 
m a0 
20 ? of the reduction Punctual-Maintenance in
Table 1, where the primary obligation is to have a at time 10, and whose compensation
is to maintain a from 0 to 20. To trigger the secondary obligation we should have the
violation of the primary obligation. This means that a holds at 10, but this implies
that it is not possible to maintain a from 0 to 20, thus it is not possible to compensate
the violation of the primary obligation. Notice that in several cases the reductions are
possible only when the intervals are just single instants.
Introduction Rules Besides the properties given so far the full meaning of the 
 oper-
ator is given by the rules to introduce (and modify) the operator. The general idea of
the introduction rules is to determine the conditions under which a norms is violated. If
these conditions imply a particular obligation then, then this obligation can be seen as
a compensation of the norm the conditions violate.
G )x a 

p
ta btb 
Y
tb g D;:btb ,!z d
G;D )x a 

p
ta btb 
z
tb d

Ip
The punctual obligation Opbtb (implied by the ﬁrst sequent) holds only at time tb thus
the only instant when the obligation can be violated is exactly tb.
Rule 
Ip is the standard rule to introduce a (novel) compensation or CTD (see [14]
for further discussion about it).
G )x a 
m
ta bts 

y
te b D;Q )z d
G;D )x a 
m
ta bt0
s 
z
t0
e d

Im whereQ = fbt0
:ts <t0
s t0 t0
e teg:
The introduction rule for 
m deﬁnes a slice of the interval where a speciﬁc compensa-
tion of the violation holds. This conditions requires a rule whose antecedent contains
the complement of a maintenance obligation in the head of the other rule, such that the
literal is temporalised with the last n consecutive instants. For example given the rules
a10 )m b10
20? c15;:b17;:b18;:b19 )p d20
20?we can derive the new rule
a10;c15 )m b17

p
19d20
20?
The conditions to derive a new compensation rule for an achievement obligation
are more complicated. As we have seen from the previous two cases, the structure of
the introduction rules is that the negation of a consequent of a norm is a member of
the antecedent of another norm (with the appropriate time). This ensures that the an-
tecedent of the norm is a breach of the other one. The idea is the same for achievement
obligations, but now detecting a violation is more complex.
G )x a 
a
ta ats
a 
x
te
a b D;Oat0
a;at0
a )z d fD;at00
a )z dg8t00
a:ts
a<t0
at00
ate
a
G;D )x a 
a
ta ats
a 
z
t0
a d

Ia
The idea behind the introduction of a compensation for achievement obligation is that
we have to determine that the obligation has not been fulﬁlled at a time before the
deadline and for all instant greater or equal to it the complement is required. Essentially,
the 
Ia amounts to shortening the deadline for an achievement obligation.
a1 )a b5
10? Ob8;:b8 )p c15
15? :b9 )p c15
15? :b10 )p c15
15?
a1 )a b5

p
8 c15
15?
The ﬁrst norm initially sets the deadline by when b at to be achieved to 10. The last n
norms, in this case n=2, have as premises the opposite of an obligation of the ﬁrst norm
covering the last n instant of the force period of the obligation and the same conclusion.
This means that refraining to fulﬁll the obligation in the last n instants results in the
same consequence. The last part is to assess that we have a violation. This is achieved
by the second norm; here, we have the obligation in the antecedent (an achievement
obligation is no longer in force in two cases: we are after the deadline or the content
of the obligation has been achieved), thus the condition Ob8 and :b8 is to ensure that
the obligation is still in force at the time, and the combination of the norms ensures that
from now on not fulﬁlling the obligation results in the same compensation.
Subsumption The inference rules combine premises in such a way as the deontic con-
tent of at least one of them is included by the conclusion. Consequently, some original
rules are no longer needed. To deal with this issue we introduce the notion of subsump-
tion.Anormsubsumesasecondwhenthebehaviourofthesecondnorm(itscompliance
condition) is implied by the ﬁrst one. Here below is an example illustrating this idea.
Example 6. Consider the following norms:
r : Invoicet )a Payt 

p
t+6PayInterestt+7
t+7?
r0 : Invoicet;OPayt+6;:Payt+6 )a PayInterestt+7
t+8?
The ﬁrst norm says that after the seller sends the invoice, the buyer has the achievement
obligation to pay within 7 days, otherwise immediately after the violation the buyer has
to pay the principal plus the interest (punctual obligation to pay at t +7). Accordingto the second norm, given the same set of circumstances Invoice at time t, if we have
still the obligation on the seventh day after the invoice receipt date and the payment
is not made yet, we have the achievement obligation to pay the interest by the eighth
day. However, (a) the primary obligation of r0 obtains when we have a violation of the
primary obligation of r; (b) after the primary obligation of r is violated, complying with
its secondary obligation entails complying with the primary obligation of r0 (but not
vice versa); (c) hence, r is more general than r0, and so the latter can be discarded.
In what follows, Deﬁnition 10 characterizes the concept of subsumption that we
have informally illustrated in Example 6. Since we need to check whether the com-
pliance of a norm guarantees the compliance of another norm (the subsumed one), we
providebelowthefollowingauxiliarydeﬁnitionstoestablish(a)Deﬁnition7:themodes
with which the compliance conditions for one obligation covers the compliance condi-
tions of another one; (b) Deﬁnition 8: when the compliance conditions of an 
-chain
cover the compliance conditions of another 
-chain; (c) Deﬁnition 9: the conditions
under which a literal belonging to an 
-chains is violated (indeed, subsumption allows
to remove the norms whose applicability conditions require to violate another norm,
while these conditions are encoded in the 
-chain of the subsuming norm).
Deﬁnition 7. Let X;Y 2 fa;m;pg. Then,Y v X iff 1) ifY = a, then X 2 fa;m;pg; 2) if
Y = m, then X = m; 3) if Y = p, then X 2 fp;mg.
Deﬁnition 8. Let
g =
x1
c
tc1
1 

x2
t0
c1
c
tc2
2 

x3
t0
c2


xj
t0
cj 1
c
tcj
j b =
y1
b
tb1
1 

y2
t0
b1
b
tb2
2 

y3
t0
b2


yk
t0
bk 1
b
tbk
k
be 
-chains. The 
-chain g d-includes the 
-chain b iff
1. j = k,
2. ci = bi,
3. yi v xi;
4. (a) if yi = a, then t0
ci tbi when xi = m, otherwise tci =tbi and t0
ci t0
bi;
(b) if either yi = m or yi = p, then tci tbi and t0
ci t0
bi
where 1  i  j;k.
Deﬁnition 9. Let
x1
c
tc1
1 

x2
t0
c1
c
tc2
2 

x3
t0
c2


xj
t0
cj 1
c
tcj
j be any 
-chain. For any ci, where
1  i  j, a set X violates ci iff
1. if xi = a, then X = fOc
t0
ci
i ;c
t0
ci
i g;
2. if xi = m or xi = p, then X  fct
ijtci t t0
cig.
Deﬁnition 10. Let r1 :G ) a 
b 
g and r2 : D ) d be two rules, where a, b, g, and
d are 
-chains such that g =
z1
c
tc1
1 

z2
t0
c1
c
tc2
2 

z3
t0
c2


zl
t0
cl 1
c
tcl
l .
Then r1 subsumes r2 iff
1. G = D and a d-includes d; or
2. G [X = D, where X violates all elements in a, and b d-includes d; or
3. G [Y = D, whereY violates all elements in b, and a 

z1
c
tc1
1 

z2
t0
c1
c
tc2
2 

z3
t0
c2


zn
t0
cn 1
c
tcn
n d-includes d, where n  l.4 Proof Conditions
We introduce the conditions that allow us to determine whether an obligation is in force
at timet (and the type of obligation as well). The problem reduces to determine whether
a (temporalised) literal follows from a theory, in other terms whether we can derive the
(temporalised) literal. In addition the conditions allow us to establish whether a theory
has been complied with. In Deﬁnition 1 we stated that a deontic expression extends
an 
-chain with ? at the end. Thus effectively the penultimate element of a deontic
expression identiﬁes the ‘last chance’ to be compliant. After that the deontic expression
results in a situation that cannot be complied with anymore. Hence, checking whether
a theory is not compliant amounts to deriving ?.
Deﬁnition 11. A tagged literal is an expression #l, where # 2
f+¶; ¶;+¶ p; ¶ p;+¶a; ¶a;+¶m; ¶mg.
Deﬁnition 12. A proof P is a sequence P(1):::P(n) of tagged literals satisfying the
proof conditions given in Deﬁnitions 15, 16, 17 and 18. Each P(i), 1  i  n is called a
line of the proof. Given a proof P, P(1::n) denotes the ﬁrst n lines of the proof.
Deﬁnition 13. A rule r is applicable at index i in a proof P at line P(n+1) iff6
1. 8a 2 A(r):
(a) if a 2 TLit, then a 2 F, and
(b) i. if a = Olt, then +¶lt 2 P(1::n),
ii. if a = :Olt, then  ¶lt 2 P(1::n); and
2. 8cj 2C(r),1  j  i:
(a) if mode(cj) = p, then cj = 2 F or cj 2 F,
(b) if mode(cj) = a, then 8t, start(cj) t  end(cj), ct
j = 2 F or ct
j 2 F,
(c) if mode(cj) = m, then 9t, start(cj) t  end(cj), ct
j = 2 F or ct
j 2 F.
Deﬁnition 14. A rule r is discarded at index i in a proof P at line P(n+1) iff
1. 9a 2 A(r):
(a) if a 2 TLit, then a 2 F; or
i. if a = Olt, then  ¶lt 2 P(1::n),
ii. if a = :Olt, then +¶lt 2 P(1::n); or
2. 8cj 2C(r),1  j  i
(a) if mode(cj) = p, then cj 2 F,
(b) if mode(cj) = a, then 8t, start(cj) t  end(cj), ct
j 2 F,
(c) if mode(cj) = m, then 9t, start(cj) t  end(cj), ct
j 2 F.
In the proof conditions below we will simply use applicable/discarded at index i, instead
of applicable/discarded at index i in the proof P at line P(n+1).
All proof tags presented in the paper will be deﬁned according the principle of
strong negation [2]. According to it, the pair of tags +# and  # are the strong nega-
tion of each other, where the strong negation is a function replacing/exchanging: 8
6 In the following, if
x1
c
tc1
1 
x2
t0
c1
 

xj
t0
cj 1
c
tcj
j 

xj+1
t0
j
 
t0
n ? is an 
-chain of length n + 1,
mode(cj) = xj, start(cj) =tcj, and end(cj) =t0
cj.and 9, conjunctions and disjunctions, and ‘applicable’ and ‘discarded’. For space rea-
sons, we provide the deﬁnition of both the positive and negative proof tags for punctual
obligation (i.e., +¶ p and  ¶ p), and only the positive deﬁnition of the proof tags for
achievement and maintenance obligations; the corresponding negative proof tags can
be derived using the above mentioned principle.
Deﬁnition 15 (Proof Conditions for ¶ p).
If P(n+1) = +¶ ppt then
(1) 9r 2 Rp
)[pt;i] r is applicable at index i and
(2) 8s 2 R[pt; j], either
(2.1) s is discarded at index j or
(2.2) 9w 2 R[pt;k] such that w is applicable at k and w  s.
If P(n+1) =  ¶ ppt then
(1) 8r 2 Rp
)[pt;i] either r is discarded at i, or
(2) 9s 2 R[pt; j] such that
(2.1) r is applicable at index j and
(2.2) 8w 2 R[pt;k] either w is discarded at k or s 6 w.
The proof conditions above are essentially a simple combination of the condition for

 given in [12] and those for punctual obligation of [16]. To prove +¶ pat, there must
be a rule for at such that all the antecedents have to be provable, and for all elements
preceding at in the head, we have to ensure that a violation occurred. This means that
we have to examine the mode of the conclusions at indexes lower that the index of at,
and then for a punctual obligation we have to see that the content of the obligation did
not happen at t. We have two cases: the ﬁrst is that we do not have at in the set of facts,
and second we have the opposite, i.e., we have at. For an achievement obligation we
have to check that for all instants in the interval the same condition as that for a punctual
obligation is satisﬁed, while for a maintenance obligation, a violation occurs when the
condition holds for at least one instant of time in the interval. Condition (2.1) and (2.2)
are the usual conditions of Defeasible Logic, that is: we have to verify that rules for the
opposite either do not ﬁre (2.1), they are not applicable, or (2.2) they are defeated by
applicable rules for the conclusion we want to prove.
Deﬁnition 16 (Proof Conditions for ¶a).
If P(n+1) = +¶apt then
(1) 9r 2 Ra
)[pt;i] r is applicable at index i and
(2) 8s 2 R[pt; j], either
(2.1) s is discarded at index j or
(2.2) 9w 2 R[pt;k] such that w is applicable at k and w  s; or
(3) 9x 2 Ra
)[pt0
;i], t0 <t, end(pt0
) t and
(3.1) x is applicable at index i, and
(3.2) 8y 2 R[pt00
; j], t0 t00 <t either
(3.2.1) y is discarded at j or
(3.2.3) 9z 2 R[pt00
;k], z is applicable at k and z  y; and
(3.3) 8t000;t00 <t000 t, pt000
= 2 F.The conditions for +¶apt are similar to those for punctual obligations. The differences
are that we have to consider persistence, clause (3). This means that we could have
derived the obligation in the past, let us say at time t0, and the obligation has not been
terminated since them. We have two ways to terminate it: there is a rule for the opposite
that is applicable between t and t0 (3.2) see [16], or the obligation has been already
fulﬁlled (3.3).
Deﬁnition 17 (Proof Conditions for ¶m).
If P(n+1) = +¶mpt then
(1) 9r 2 Rm
)[pt;i] r is applicable at index i and
(2) 8s 2 R[pt; j], either
(2.1) s is discarded at index j or
(2.2) 9w 2 R[pt;k] such that w is applicable at k and w  s; or
(3) 9x 2 Rm
)[pt0
;i], t0 <t, end(pt0
) t and
(3.1) x is applicable at index i, and
(3.2) 8y 2 R[pt00
; j], t0 t00 <t either
(3.2.1) y is discarded at j or
(3.2.3) 9z 2 R[pt00
;k], z is applicable at k and z  y.
The conditions for maintenance obligations are the same as those for achievement obli-
gation with the difference that fulﬁlling the obligation does not terminate it.
Deﬁnition 18 (Proof Condition for ¶). If P(n+1) = +¶pt, then either +¶ ppt 2
P(1::n), or +¶apt 2 P(1::n), or +¶aprpt 2 P(1::n), or +¶mpt 2 P(1::n).
If P(n+1) =  ¶pt, then  ¶ ppt 2 P(1::n), and  ¶apt 2 P(1::n), and +¶aprpt 2
P(1::n), and +¶mpt 2 P(1::n).
Deﬁnition 19. Given a theory D, the universe of D (UD) is the set of all the atoms
occurring in D. The extension ED of D is a structure (¶+;¶ ), where, for X 2fp;a;mg,
¶+
D = flt : D ` +¶Xltg and ¶ 
D = flt : D `  ¶Xltg.
Example 7. Consider the following theory:
F = fInvoicet;:Payt;:Payt+1;PayInterestt+2;Defectivetg
R = fr1 : Invoicet )a Payt 
t+1?
r2 : Invoicet;OPayt+1;:Payt+1 )a PayInterestt+2
t+3?;
r3 : Defectivet ; :Paytg
= fr1  r3g
The ﬁrst two norms basically describe the same situation of Example 6: the only differ-
ence is that here we have not yet applied any introduction rule for 
. r3 states that, if
the delivered good is defective, the customer is allowed not to pay. The facts trigger r1,
thus we derive the obligation to pay by t +1 (starting from t): also r3 is triggered but is
weaker than r1. The obligation to pay is however not fulﬁlled by F. Since :Payt 2 F,
we obtain OPayt+1 from r1, which contributes to triggers r2, thus obtaining the obliga-
tion to pay the interest by t+3 (starting from t+2). Since the obligation to pay by t+1
is not fulﬁlled, the extension of the theory D contains ?: r1 was not complied with.5 Checking Compliance
If we work on the idea that a set of facts may fulﬁll a set of norms even when some
of these norms are violated (but such violations are always compensated), then the
following deﬁnition of compliance does not sufﬁce:
Deﬁnition 20 (Theory compliance). A Defeasible Theory D is compliant iff ? 62 ¶+
D .
Deﬁnition 20 is very simple and exploits the basic properties of any temporalized obli-
gations: since all 
-chains have ? as their last element, they have an ultimate deadline
beyond which we derive ?: this amounts to saying that after that deadline we state that
it is impossible to compensate. Since the proof conditions for our logic establish that
an obligation in an 
-chain is derived only if the previous obligations in that chain are
violated, if we have ? in the positive extension of a theory, this means that there is at
least one obligation whose violation cannot be compensated. For instance, if we con-
sider Example 7, according to Deﬁnition 20 the theory D is not compliant because the
theory extension contains ?. However, such a theory should be considered compliant,
since norm r2, which provides a compensation for the violation of r1, is indeed fulﬁlled.
Normalisation Process The inference rules (
Ip), (
Im), and (
Ia) provide a method
for representing the norms in a format that can be used to check the compliance of a
theory. In fact, they allow for making explicit the hidden reparative relation between
obligations. Once applied, the redundant rules can be removed. For instance, in Exam-
ple 7 above, we could apply (
Ia) to r1 and r2 and obtain the new rule
r3 : Invoicet )a Payt 
a
t+1PayInterestt+2
t+3?
Once r3 is obtained, since r2 is subsumed by r3, then r2 is deontically redundant and
can be removed from the theory.
Formally, this process is called normalisation of a theory. Before presenting the pro-
cess, some auxiliary notions are needed: (a) Deﬁnition 21 identiﬁes all the instances of
inference rules we can obtain from a theory; (b) since such instances allow to introduce
new norms, we should establish when these norms can inherit the same strength quali-
ﬁcations (via ) of previous norms; we should also remove redundant norms and norm
priorities (Deﬁnitions 22 and 23); (c) Deﬁnition 24 introduces the deductive closure of
a theory under the inference conditions for 
.
Deﬁnition 21. Let D = (F;R ) be any defeasible theory. Any instance I of the infer-
ence rules (
Ip), (
Im), and (
Ia) is based on D if each of the premises ri and rj of I is
either (a) in R (in which case, the instance is rooted), or (b) is the conclusion of another
instance of the inference rules (
Ip), (
Im), and (
Ia) based on D.
The instances of the inference rules (
Ip), (
Im), and (
Ia) based on D are also
called D-
-instances.
Deﬁnition 22. LetD=(F;R)beanydefeasibletheory.Thesuperiorityrelation¥=
[¥
i=1 i is recursively deﬁned as follows:
– 0= [f(j;k)j j (or k) is the conclusion of a rooted D-
-instance such that k 2 R
(or j 2 R) and, for any i 2 R, (i;k) 2 (or (j;i) 2) g;– i+1=i [f(j;k)j j (or k) is the conclusion of a D-
-instance such that (i;k) 2i
(or (j;i) 2i) g.
The relation ¥ is called the D-saturation of .
Deﬁnition 23. Let D = (F;R ) be any defeasible theory. Let S be an operation over
D deﬁned as follows: if P = frjr 2 R;9r0 2 R : r0 subsumes rg, then
S(D) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
D0 where D0 = (F;R0;0) such that
R0 = R P and
0=¥  f(x;y) 2 j either x 2 P or y 2 Pg
D otherwise
(10)
Deﬁnition 24. If D = (F;R ) is any defeasible theory, let `
 be the consequence
relation deﬁned by the inference rules (
Ip), (
Im), and (
Ia). The closure (D;`
) of
D under `i is a theory D0 = (F;R0;0) where (a) R0 is the smallest set containing all
elements of R and the conclusions of all D-
-instances; (b) 0 is the D-saturation of .
Deﬁnition 25 (Theorynormalisation).ThenormalisationD¥ ofatheory Disatheory
recursively obtained as follows: (a) D0 = D, (b) Di+1 = S(Di;`
).
The inference rules and the rule removal via subsumption must be done several
times in the appropriate order. The normalised theory is the ﬁxed-point of the above
constructions.Ateachstepofthetheprocedurewehavetoﬁrstapplytheinferencerules
for 
 and then the subsumption: suppose we have a theory containing the following
three norms
r1 : ftf )p ata 

p
ta gtg 
tg ? r2 : ete )p ata 

p
ta btb 

p
tb ctc 

p
tc dtd 
td ?
r3 : ete;:ata;:btb )p ctc 
tc ?
The normalisation process would consist here in a single cycle leading to apply (i)
(
Ip) to r1 and r3, thus producing r4 :ete; ftf;:btb )p ata

p
tactc
tc?; (ii) subsumption
and remove r3. Notice that also r2 subsumes r3. However, if we apply subsumption ﬁrst
on this basis we have to delete r3 and r4 would be no longer derivable from r1 and r3
alone.
After a theory is normalised, Deﬁnition 20 can be safely applied, as all redundant
rules are removed and all hidden reparative connections between obligations are made
explicit.
Finally, notice that (i) the structure of the inference rules (
Ip), (
Im), and (
Ia)
states that one premise in all instances is subsumed by the conclusion and so is removed
at the end of each step of the process; (ii) any defeasible theory contains only ﬁnitely
many rules and each rule has ﬁnitely many elements; also the operation on which the
construction is deﬁned is monotonic [14].
If a superiority relation  is consistent iff (x;y);(y;x) 62, then reason (i) above
supports the following result:
Proposition 1. For any defeasible theory D, the normalisation D¥ =(F;R;¥) is such
that ¥ is consistent.
Also, so by standard set theory results, reason (ii) above supports the following:
Proposition 2. The normalisation D¥ of any defeasible theory D exists and is unique.6 Summary and Related Work
This paper extends the logic of violation proposed by [14] with time. This extension
introduces a temporal dimension to the language saying when a norm produces its nor-
mative effects, or in other terms when the obligation (or, in general the normative po-
sition) corresponding to the normative effect of the norm is in force. An immediate
consequence of the extended language is that it is possible to investigate the ‘lifecycle’
of obligations, and more precisely if there are deadlines to comply with an obligation.
The extension is done to properly deal with the concept of legal compliance. To do this
we argue that we have to handle different types of temporalised legal obligations and
devise a normalisation procedure for making hidden conditions and reparative chains
explicit. One open research issue is to investigate the complexity of this procedure,
which requires, several times and in the appropriate order, to apply the inference rules
for 
 and to remove redundant norms.
TheliteratureonnormcomplianceisMASislarge(see,e.g.,[5,9,20,10,1,11,17,3,19]).
However, tothe best of ourknowledge no work inthe ﬁeld has sofar attempted tomodel
legalcompliancepertainingtorealisticsystemswherecomplexnorm-enforcementmech-
anisms such as reparative chains are combined with a rich ontology of obligations as
the one described here. In the literature on deontic logic, besides a few exceptions like
[6], the research has mostly devoted extensive, but separate, efforts to the role of time
for dealing with CTDs (since the seminal [25]) and on logical systems for modeling
the concept deontic preference and CTDs (for an overview, [23]). This paper combines
the two perspectives: in this sense, it also inherits from [14] the advantage of avoiding
the most well-known CTD paradoxes. In this sense, [6] shares with our paper the same
general view, but time is captured there at the semantic level and the language does not
explicitly handle timestamps.
Combinationoftimeandnormsarenotnovel,asmanycombinationsoftemporal(or
tense) logic and deontic logic have been investigated. However, temporal logic cannot
handle speciﬁc times (or timestamps). Typically these logics can express the temporal
relationshipsbetweenevents(representedbypropositions),ortherelationshipsbetween
states. A possible solution to obviate this is to consider hybrid logic using nominals to
capture nominals [22]. A nominal represents a proposition true only in one possible
worlds. A temporal nominal represents a particular instant of time. In most temporal
logic it is possible to model branching of time, and the meaning of nominals is not clear
in this kind of situations (is the world corresponding to a nominal the same in all the
branches, or we have different copies of the same instant of time?). On the other hand
timestamps (and events) have been used in the Event Calculus. Event Calculus has been
used to model the interaction between norms and time (see, e.g., [21]). However, Event
Calculus is a dialect of ﬁrst-order logic and Herrestad [18] has shown that these types
of logic are not suitable to model normative reasoning in presence of violations.
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